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I. INTRODUCTION
The troops of armed forces1 were deployed to the contested zone2
to contain and rout the Boko Haram insurgency in Northeastern
Nigeria using a tactic of “relentless pursuit.”3 By the wake of 2017,
not only did the troopers turn the tide of the insurgency, there were
also records of serial institutional culpability for human rights
violation and war crime: Sporadic shootings with consequent pockmarking of homes with bullets,4 wanton destruction and looting of
properties belonging to civilians,5 arbitrary detention of innocent
people without charge, in some cases, for the apparent purpose of
1. James Adewunmi Falode, The Nature of Nigeria’s Boko Haram War,
2010-2015: A Strategic Analysis, 10 PERSPS. ON TERRORISM 41, 42 (2016)
(including the Nigerian Joint Task Force which is comprised of the Nigerian Police
Force, Nigerian Navy, Nigerian Air Force, and Nigerian Army; the Civil Joint
Task Force which consists of vigilante groups, hunters, farmers and youths who
are fluent in the local language and also understand the local culture, religion, and
geography of the contested zone; and the Special Military Joint Task Force which
includes personnel from the Nigerian Police Force, the Department of State
Security (DSS), the Nigerian Immigration Force and the Defense Intelligence
Agencies).
2. Id. (defining contested zones as that space where the opposing forces meet,
with a view to realizing their economic, political, social, and religious objectives
by means of force and psychological operations).
3. Id. (noting that this is a tactic used to match Boko Haram’s hit-and-run
strategy, and it has been effective in defending against Boko Haram).
4. Human Rights Watch: Satellite Images Show Army Abuse in Baga,
LOGBABY.COM (May 2, 2013), http://logbaby.com/news/human-rights-watch-_16638.html#.Wl_8traZPVp (reporting that in a fire fight between the Joint Task
Force and Boko Haram in Baga, a Nigerian border with Lake Chad and Cameroon,
the residents reportedly accused the Joint Task Force of firing indiscriminately).
5. See Borno & Yobe States Peoples Forum, Nigeria: Memorandum to the
National Conference on the Security Challenges in Borno and Yobe States,
ALLAFRICA (Apr. 7, 2014), http://allafrica.com/stories/201404081256.html
(lamenting that security agents often break into people’s homes in the middle of
the night on the excuse of the state of emergency and sometimes commit acts of
robbery and looting of people’s homes and business properties in the name of
hunting for members of Boko Haram).
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extorting money in return for their release,6 and the arbitrary killings
of both members of Boko Haram7 and unarmed civilians.8
Indeed, the institutional culpability of the armed forces in Nigeria
predates the Boko Haram counter-insurgency operation. It began
with the 1967 Asaba Massacres during the Nigeria’s Civil War9 and
reached its crescendo sometime in 1999 with the invasion of a
community named Odi by the armed forces.10 Although, in Odi’s
case, the Federal High Court sitting in Port Harcourt awarded
damages against the Nigerian Army, it is somewhat curious that the
military, again, took offensive in its anti-Boko Haram operation.11
6. Sani Tukur, How Nigeria Military Arrest, Torture, Exploit Innocents at
Giwa Barracks, PREMIUM TIMES (Jan. 13, 2013), https://www.premium
timesng.com/news/114950-how-nigeria-military-arrest-torture-exploit-innocentsat-giwagiwa-barracks-html (detailing how innocent people are randomly arrested
and detained at Giwa barracks and adding that those released were asked to pay a
high sum of money as ‘bail’).
7. See Adeolu Ade Adewumi, The Battle for the Minds: The Insurgency and
Counter Insurgency in Northern Nigeria, 4 WEST AFR. INSIGHT 3, 5 (2014)
(narrating that by July 30, 2009, Shiek Mohammed Yusuf, the alleged leader of
Boko Haram, was killed under questionable circumstances in police custody); see
also Falode, supra note 1, at 44 (arguing that the unlawful killing of Yusuf pushed
Boko Haram to embrace a more combative approach).
8. See Human Rights Watch: Satellite Images Show Army Abuse in Baga,
supra note 4 (highlighting that, in a fight between the Nigerian armed forces and
Boko Haram in Baga, reportedly up to 187 people were killed and 77 others were
injured).
9. See S. Elizabeth Bird & Fraser M. Ottanelli, Revisiting The 1967 Asaba
Massacre, VANGUARD (Oct. 29, 2016, 5:20 AM), https://www.vanguardngr.com/
2016/10/revisiting-1967-asaba-massacre/ (recalling that during the war over the
secession of the predominantly Igbo Eastern Region, renamed Biafra, soldiers
occupied Asaba and began killing hundreds of civilians accused of Biafran
collaboration).
10. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2000: THE DESTRUCTION OF
ODI AND RAPE IN CHOBA DECEMBER 22, 1999 (2000), https://www.hrw.org/
report/1999/12/22/destruction-odi-and-rape-choba/december-22-1999 (highlighting
how President Olusegun Obasanho sent soldiers from the Nigerian army to Odi’s
community in revenge of the killing of twelve Nigerian policemen in the
community over a rising clamor from those living in the oil producing areas for a
greater share of the oil wealth; and how the soldiers killed nearly everybody in the
community of perhaps 15,000 people, and demolished every single building,
barring the bank, the Anglican church and the health center).
11. This is curious because the military seems to be undeterred by the public
condemnation of their action which led the court to order them to pay $37.6 billion
as compensation to the people of Odi in Bayelsa State.
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The Nigerian military carried out various extra-judicial killings,
enforced disappearances, and tortures and other ill-treatments, most
of which led to deaths in custody. A recent Preliminary Examination
Report12 on Nigeria released by the International Criminal Court’s
Office of Prosecutor identified two possible cases of war crimes and
crime against humanity perpetrated by the Nigerian military in its
anti-Boko Haram operation.13
Views have been expressed to the effect that the Nigerian armed
forces are betting on the nature of the humanitarian law of internal
armed conflict.14 Therefore, the essence of considering the applicable
International Humanitarian Law (IHL)15 in Nigeria’s Boko Haram
conflict is not only for the sources of Nigerian humanitarian law, but
also for the practical necessity of determining how IHL can be
complementarily applied with International Human Rights Law
(IHRL).16 This approach is deliberate, and an important one; IHL
governs the issue of the existence of an armed conflict, and parties
12. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, OFFICE OF THE
ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION ACTIVITIES (2015).

PROSECUTOR, REPORT

13. Id. This report summarizes the preliminary examination activities
conducted by the Office of the Prosecutor between November 1, 2014 and October
31, 2015. According to the report, the Nigerian military’s indiscriminate arrest,
detention, torture, and extra judicial killings of people suspected to be Boko Haram
fighters and collaborators constituted the first instance of crimes against humanity.
The report also stated that the second crime committed by the military was its
attacks on certain populations as well as the recruitment of child soldiers by progovernment military called the civilian Joint Task Force. See Ronald Mutum &
Abbas Jimoh, Boko Haram: Insurgents, Army Committing War Crimes - ICC,
DAILY TR. (Nov. 15, 2015, 12:26 AM), https://www.dailytrust.com.ng/news/
general/boko-haram-insurgents-army-committing-war-crimes-icc/119421.html.
14. See Gus Waschefort, Africa and International Humanitarian Law: The
More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same, 98 INT’L REV. RED CROSS
593, 608 (2016) (discussing a study that found that seventy-one percent of
Nigerians found that the Geneva Convention has helped in reducing internal
conflict).
15. See Adam Roberts, Counter-Terrorism, Armed Force and the Laws of War,
44 SURVIVAL 7, 8 (2002) (noting that this is also referred to as laws of war, and
IHL is the product of negotiations between states, and reflect their experiences and
interests, including those of their armed forces).
16. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec.
10, 1948); see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 6 I.L.M. 368, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 360
(1967), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1876).
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are laden with obligations which they must comply with.
Despite the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) clarification that
IHRL does not cease to apply in times of armed conflict,17 its
reference to the concept of lex specialis to address the issue of
coordination is somewhat vague. The implication is that where there
is a conflict between rules of IHL and that of IHRL, IHL should
prevail by reason of its specificity. However, the major weakness in
the position of the ICJ is that it does not offer guidance as to how the
possible antinomies between the two bodies of the rules should be
identified and addressed in practice.18 Thus, the aim of this Article is
to take a sober look at IHL applicable to internal conflict; briefly
touching on IHRL, and identifying coordinating criterion for their
relationship which shall bring about remedy and reparation for
victims of human rights violation in Nigeria’s Boko Haram conflict.
The goal of this Article is to show that, due to a minimal provision
of Common Article 3 and its principal subsequent Additional
Protocol II, there still remains a normative deadlock in Nigerian
internal armed conflict. Necessities for military observance of the
rules of engagement are waning, and concern for the respect of the
rules of law continues to suffer neglect. Lest it be misunderstood, I
do not doubt the relevance of Nigerian municipal laws19 and certain
customary norms.20 Rather, I show that there is a blank canvas in the
17. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, 240 (July 8) (determining the relationship between human
rights law and humanitarian law in terms of the right to life).
18. Marco Pertile & Chiara Vitucci, Introduction to On the Relationship
Between IHL and IHRL ‘Where It Matters Once More: Assessing the Position of
the European Court of Human Rights After Hassan and Jaloud, 16 QUESTIONS
INT’L L. 1, 1 (2015), http://www.qil-qdi.org/on-the-relationship-between-ihl-andihrl-where-it-matters-once-more-assessing-the-position-of-the-european-court-ofhuman-rights-after-hassan-and-jaloud/.
19. Criminal Code Act (1990) Cap. (77), §§ 306, 315, 351, 352, 353, 355, 360,
364, 369, 443, 452 (Nigeria), http://www.nigeria-law.org/Criminal%20Code%20
Act-Tables.htm (demonstrating insights into the Nigeria’s penal regulation on
inhumane conduct during armed conflict).
20. These include the requirement that action taken in self-defense must not
exceed what is necessary and proportionate. See Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgement, 1986 I.C.J. Rep.
14, ¶ 194 (June 27); see also Jasmine Moussa, Can Jus ad Bellum Override Jus in
Bello? Reaffirming the Separation of the Two Bodies of Law, 90 INT’L REV. RED
CROSS 963, 963 (2008) (attempting to settle confusion over the concepts of Jus ad
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treaty-based humanitarian law applicable to internal conflict.
For the avoidance of doubt, the emphasis in this Article is on the
coordination of normative rules between IHL and IHRL applicable to
internal armed conflict. The choice of the principle of Systemic
Integration in the coordination thereof, as well as reference to
Nigeria’s Boko Haram’s ‘war’ as an internal conflict in focus are not
less important. Therefore, for completeness of treatment, it is
important to make a few points at this juncture.
First, Systemic Integration lex specialis21 figures among the rules
of coordination included in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (VCLT)22 and has been codified as a rule of general
application in international law. Secondly, Systemic Integration is a
mandatory part of the interpretative process which demands that a
rule of international law be construed taking into account all other
international norms deriving from any source, that are applicable in
and relevant to a certain situation.23 The third point is that, insofar as
the principle allows interpretation of one body of law in light of the
other, it can be employed as a legal–theoretical basis to provide
remedies under IHRL for violation of IHL in Nigeria’s Boko Haram
conflict.
Despite the contrary shared views of the advocates of state
sovereignty and the corollary principle of consent, the move to
coordinate the rules of IHL and IHRL through the principle of
Systemic Integration in the Nigeria-Boko Haram conflict is a
necessity.24 Some rules, like peremptory human rights norms, are of
Bellum and Jus in Bello).
21. See Silvia Borelli, The (Mis)-Use of General Principles of Law: Lex
Specialis and the Relationship Between International Human Rights Law and the
Laws of Armed Conflict, in GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND THE JUDICIARY:
THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 265 (Laura Pineschi ed., 2015) (tracing the principle
commonly expressed in the maxim lex specialis derogate legis generali to Roman
law and quoting the definition given to the maxim by the 2006 ILC’s Study Group
“that whenever two or more norms deal with the same subject matter, priority
should be given to the norm that is more specific”).
22. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(c), opened for
signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 340.
23. See Borelli, supra note 21, at 265.
24. See Father Robert Araujo, Sovereignty, Human Rights, and SelfDetermination: The Meaning of International Law, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1477,
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such great necessity to human kind that the requirement of consent to
establish binding obligations on states would be undesirable.
Part I beams a search light on anti-Boko Haram operations in
Nigeria. Part II proceeds with the IHL applicable to anti-Boko
Haram operations. Part III discusses that the human rights violation
of the armed forces in anti-Boko Haram operation under
humanitarian law of internal armed conflict, while Part IV argues
that IHRL is a complementary body of law to IHL. Now, it is the
philosophy of accepting IHL and IHRL as complementary laws of
war that brings clearly into focus the principle of Systemic
Integration as a coordinating criterion for their relationship. Part V,
concludes by demonstrating how the principle of state sovereignty
and consent will inhibit the criterion of Systemic Integration.

II. GENERAL REFLECTION ON ANTI-BOKO
HARAM OPERATIONS
A. THE BIRTH AND GROWTH OF A TERROR
From the beginning when the British formally took control of
northern Nigeria to 1914 when both the South and the North were
amalgamated, oppositions among most Northerners to the British
Western influence grew by the decade.25 In particular, many
Muslims in the area felt that education had too many western
influences because of its emphasis on democratic ideas and
strengthening the social position of girls and their matureness.26
Muslims seem to argue that all knowledge of western origin is
suspect, and educating girls is Western cultural imperialism.27
Sometime in 1995, a movement named Sahaba emerged to purge
the region of its western legacy of British administration.28 This
1480 (2000) (highlighting that popular sovereignty is essential to human rights).
25. See Femi Owolade, Boko Haram: How a Militant Islamist Group Emerged
in Nigeria, GATESTONE INST. (Mar. 27, 2014, 5:00 AM), https://www.gatestone
institute.org/4232/boko-haram-nigeria (emphasizing that Boko Haram’s emergence
is a result of military misadventure into Northern Nigeria).
26. See id.
27. Id.
28. Shehu Sani, Boko Haram: The Northern Nigeria (Hausa land) (2),
VANGUARD (July 1, 2011, 12:00 AM), https://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/07/
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group openly condemned the thriving culture of western education in
the region.29 With the change of its name to Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna
Lidda’awati Wal Jihad in 2002,30 the group widely known by its
Hausa name Boko Haram, vigorously indoctrinated considerable
followers with the campaign of Western education as sin.
During this period, Boko Haram’s activities consisted mainly of
civil, social, and religious acts of disobedience to established local
norms.31 It was only after 2009 that the group morphed into a salafijihadist terrorist organization.32 Since then, the group has committed
heinous crimes against Nigerian citizens and their neighbors.33
Indeed, Boko Haram militants have carried out numerous gun attacks
and bombings, in some cases using suicide bombs on a wide array of
venues including police stations, military facilities, churches,
schools, beer halls, newspaper offices, and the United Nations
building in the capital, Abuja.34
Given the increased frequency of bomb attacks and shootings
carried out by Boko Haram, the United States Department of State,
boko-haram-the-northern-nigeria-hausaland-2/ (reporting that the group sought to
abolish the secular Nigerian constitution in favor of the Islamic state and wanted to
establish a complete Sharia-based state in 19 Northern states and all over Nigeria).
29. Id.
30. Opayemi Agbaje, The Evolution of Boko Haram, KINGDOM NEWS (Nov. 9,
2014), http://kingdomnewsng.com/articles/142-the-evolution-of-boko-haram-parts1-3 (noting that the group’s formal name, Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’wati WalJihad, means ‘People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophets Teachings and
Jihad’).
31. See Falode, supra note 1, at 43-44 (explaining that before 2010 Boko
Haram’s attacks were unorganized and haphazardly carried out, but after 2010,
Boko Haram began using more sophisticated weapons and strategic planning).
32. Id. at 43.
33. See id. at 44-46 (describing many of Boko Haram’s heinous crimes,
including: A 2011 suicide car-bombing in Nigeria’s capital directed against the UN
building that killed 21 persons and injured 73 others; a 2014 kidnapping of more
than 200 schoolgirls from their dormitory in Chibok, a northern city in Nigeria; a
2014 attack on a police station in Cameroon; and a devastating attack in
Ngouboua, Chad).
34. Daniel Williams & Eric Guttschuss, Spiraling Violence: Boko Haram
Attacks and Security Force Abuses in Nigeria, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 11, 2012),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/10/11/spiraling-violence/boko-haram-attacksand-security-force-abuses-nigeria (commenting that since July 2001, suspected
members of Boko Haram have committed horrific crimes against Nigeria’s
citizens).
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in 2012, named three of Boko Haram’s leaders as “Specially
Designated Global Terrorists.”35 Two years later, Boko Haram was
declared the deadliest terror group.36 The group’s attacks on the
Chibok Government Secondary School37 and elementary students in
Damasack38 have become emblematic of its growing pangs of terror.
However, the group sees these terrorist practices as cultural
relativism in the sense of disavowing British misadventure into the
northern part of Nigeria.39 Arguably, if the cause of the Boko Haram
Sect was just by relying on cultural and religious immunity from
humanitarian standards, then any means to achieving that end could
35. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism and
Countering Violent Extremism, Terrorist Designations of Boko Haram
Commander Abubakar Shekau, Khalid al-Barnawi and Abubakar Adam Kambar
(June 21, 2012), https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/266615.htm (noting that
Executive Order 13224 designated three Nigerian leaders of Boko Haram as
“Specially Designated Global Terrorists,” blocking the identified leaders’ property
interests subject to U.S. jurisdiction and prohibiting U.S. persons from engaging in
transactions with or for the benefit of the identified leaders).
36. Dionne Searcey & Marc Santora, Boko Haram Ranked Ahead of ISIS for
Deadliest Terror Group, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/11/19/world/africa/boko-haram-ranked-ahead-of-isis-for-deadliest-terrorgroup.html. (reporting that in 2014 Boko Haram was responsible for 6,644 deaths
compared to 6,073 deaths at the hands of ISIS); see INST. FOR ECON. AND PEACE,
GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2015 at 6 (2015), http://economicsandpeace.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf (indicating that 6,644
deaths were attributed to Boko Haram in 2014, an increase of 317 percent).
37. See Jacob Zenn, Boko Haram and the Kidnapping of the Chibok
Schoolgirls, 7 CTC SENTINEL, May 2014, at 1, 1, https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/bokoharam-and-the-kidnapping-of-the-chibok-schoolgirls (analyzing Boko Haram’s
ability to cause political instability and turmoil in Nigeria and internationally, as
proven by Boko Haram’s kidnapping of more than 250 school girls from Chibok in
Nigeria’s Northeastern Borno State in 2014).
38. See Conor Gaffey, Boko Haram Kidnapped 300 Schoolchildren in
Damasak: HRW, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 31, 2016, 5:52 AM), http://www.news
week.com/boko-haram-kidnapped-300-schoolchildren-damasak-hrw-442565
(suggesting that the kidnapping of over 300 children from a primary school in
Damasack has remained largely outside of mainstream news reporting because of
pressure from the Nigerian government to keep it silent).
39. Boko Haram: International Criminal Court Declares Conflict as Civil War,
WILL NIGERIA (Nov. 25, 2013), https://thewillnigeria.com/news/boko-haraminternational-criminal-court-declares-conflict-as-civil-war/ (noting that the
International Criminal Court declared the armed confrontation between the
Nigerian military and Boko Haram as a civil war and suggested that Boko Haram’s
attacks are carried-out pursuant to the group’s goal of imposing an exclusive
Islamic system of government in Nigeria).
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be justified.
Nonetheless, the armed attacks carried out by the militant group,
no doubt, threaten to further destabilize an already volatile nation. In
fact, the Boko Haram conflict has been characterized by the
International Committee of the Red Cross and the International
Criminal Court as an armed conflict of non-international character.40
This characterization triggers certain rights and obligations for the
Nigerian government to protect its territorial integrity under
international law. Therefore, the next part of this Section will take a
look at how the Nigerian government exercises its right to selfdefense against the Boko Haram insurgency.

B. IN DEFENSE OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY:
EXERCISING RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE
AGAINST BOKO HARAM
Since terrible and unbearable pressure, in the form of bombs,
suicide bombers, cultural genocide, and oppression of women and
children, are the core components of Boko Haram’s tactics, nobody
can deny that serious armed attacks have been carried-out within the
territorial jurisdiction of Nigeria. As a response, Nigeria resorted to
a countermeasure attack in self-defense against the militants.41
Surely, the only response available to a state experiencing an act of
aggression is a countermeasure.42 That countermeasure must follow
the exercise of all other peaceful diplomatic means reasonably at the
state’s disposal, be necessary to stop the aggression, and be directly
proportional, but not necessarily exactly the same as the aggressive
act. Article 51 of United Nations Charter provides that:

40. Id.
41. Anne Look, Nigerian Forces Counter-Attack Against Boko Haram;
Hundreds of Deaths Reported, VOA (Jan. 9, 2015, 11:18 AM), https://www.voa
news.com/a/senator-boko-haram-attacks-northeast-nigeria/2590776.html
(describing how the unsuccessful and deadly counter-attack led by the Nigerian
government against Boko Haram in the town of Baga killed hundreds, if not
thousands, of innocent civilians and displaced thousands more).
42. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 1986
I.C.J. Rep. ¶¶ 194-95 (noting that a state may exercise its right of self-defense if
the state has been the victim of an armed attack).
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Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of
the United Nations until the Security Council has taken measure
necessary to maintain international peace and security.43

Although there is no mention of non-state actors in Article 51, it
seems implausible to maintain that acts of terrorism for which no
state is responsible are not capable of constituting armed attack
within the meaning of the Article.44 Thus, it is only logical to infer
from the Article the fact that an occupying power has the right to
defend its own civilian citizens if there is an armed attack.
Accordingly, there is nothing in the text of Article 51 that stipulates
that self-defense is available only when an armed attack is made by a
state. On a whole, self-defense, being “an inherent right,” does not
“require that armed attacks by terrorists be attributable to the
territorial state under the rules of state responsibility.”45
However, by invoking the right to self-defense in response to
serial armed attacks carried out by the Boko Haram militant group, a
wide acceptance of such a right becomes clear. Specifically, in
43. U.N. Charter art. 51, ¶ 1. The United Nations Charter, ratified on October
24, is a multilateral international treaty with 192 members states. On June 26, 1945
in the Herbst Theater auditorium in San Francisco, delegates from 50 nations sign
the United Nations Charter, establishing the world body as a means of saving
“succeeding generation form the scourge of war.” Id. pmbl.
44. Laurie R. Blank, International Law and Cyber Threats from Non-State
Actors, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 406, 411-13 (2013) (explaining that Article 51 does not
limit the right of self-defense in response to only threats or use of force by other
states and highlighting post-9/11 state practice as evidence of the existence of the
right of self-defense against non-state aggressors).
45. Nico Schrijver & Larissa van den Herik, Leiden Policy Recommendations
on Counter-Terrorism and International Law, 57 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 531, 544
(2010); see Daniel Bethlehem, Self-Defense Against an Imminent or Actual Armed
Attack by Non-State Actors, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 769, 773-74 (2012) (observing that
while states have a right to self-defense against attacks by non-state actors, the
complexity of modern-day cross-border terrorist organizations produces questions
of where, how, and when an attacked state may assert its right of self-defense); The
Chatham House Principles of International Law on the Use of Force in SelfDefence, 55 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 963, 969-70 (2006) (recognizing the right to selfdefense regardless of whether the source of the attack is a state or non-state actor
and noting that when a state is unable or unwilling to assert control over a terrorist
organization within its territory, an attacked state may act in self-defense against
the terrorist organization in the state where the terrorist organization is located).
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Northeastern Nigeria, four civilian regimes have invoked the right to
use force in self–defense against the Boko Haram Sect.46 These four
regimes, all practicing a presidential system of government, are the
regimes of Obasanjo,47 Yar’adua,48 Jonathan,49 and Buhari.50 The
regimes engaged security forces to mount defenses against Boko
Haram members.51 The nature of the defense consisted of the cooperation among the Joint Task Force (now Special Military Joint
Task Force) and the involvement of troops from neighboring
countries and local communities.52
These four civilian regimes had remarkable successes in high
profile arrests of insurgents and offensive operations on the terrorist
camps and dislodgement of several bases. Especially, with the
provision of intelligence by local communities to armed forces so as
to ensure that innocent people were not targeted wrongly as BokoHaram members.53

46. See E. Remi Aiyede, Democratic Security Sector Governance and Military
Reform in Nigeria, in LEARNING FROM WEST AFRICAN EXPERIENCES IN SECURITY
SECTOR GOVERNANCE 97, 98-99, 114-15 (Alan Bryden & Fairlie Chappuis eds.,
2015) (analyzing the efforts of recent Nigerian presidents and government officials
to reform the countries security forces).
47. See List of Nigerian Presidents From 1960 Till Present, ONLINE NIGERIA
(Jan. 22, 2017, 8:51 PM), https://news2.onlinenigeria.com/nigeria-article/404111list-of-nigerian-presidents-from-1960-till-present.html (noting Olusegun Aremu
Obasanjo, the twelfth President of Nigeria, was in office between May 29, 1999
and May 29, 2007).
48. See id. (mentioning Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, the thirteenth President of
Nigeria, was in office between May 29, 2007 and May 5, 2010).
49. See id. (noting that Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, the fourteenth President of
Nigeria, was in office between May 6, 2010 and May 29, 2015).
50. See id. (explaining that Muhammadu Buhari, the fifteenth and President of
Nigeria, assumed office on May 29, 2015).
51. See Aiyede, supra note 46, at 110, 112-14 (discussing how the Nigerian
government’s efforts since the late-1990s to reform its military in order to rid the
country of corruption and better protect its citizens from contemporary threats to
security have been largely unsuccessful; although some progress has been made).
52. Falode, supra note 1, at 44.
53. Defeating Boko Haram, THIS DAY (Mar. 21, 2016), www.thisdaylive.com/
index.php/2016/03/21/defeating-boko-haram/ (explaining that with increased civil–
military cooperation and effective implementation of intelligence-gathering and
intelligence-sharing, security in the northeastern Nigeria has improved
tremendously recently with nearly all the territories recovered).
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Nevertheless, the successes are often opportunistic rather than
strategic.54 The absence of a clear defense strategy in any of the
campaigns launched by the four regimes against the Boko Haram
Sect takes away the element of direction and systematic approach to
successful ‘war’ on the Boko Haram Insurgency. Far too often
members of security forces have been accused of damages, tortures,
and deaths of innocent people in the name of territorial defense
against terrorism.55 Meanwhile, in any armed conflict, including the
one of Boko Haram, the fact that an action is taken in self–defense
does not preclude it from complying with certain rules of law.56
Instead, there exist certain laws of war that apply in situations of
armed conflict.

III. THE HUMANITARIAN LAWS APPLICABLE TO
ANTI-BOKO HARAM OPERATIONS
Within the international legal system, Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Convention of 194957 is generally accepted as an
enumeration of the regulations of internal armed conflicts. These
regulations are an affirmative obligation to collect and care for the
wounded and sick, and express prohibition of four specific categories
of acts:
a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,
mutilations, cruel treatment and torture; b) taking of hostages; c) outrages
54. See Eromo Egbejule, They’re Defeating Boko Haram But Are They
Nigeria’s Next Security Threat?, IRIN NEWS (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.irin
news.org/feature/2016/08/22/they%E2%80%99re-defeating-boko-haram-are-theynigeria%E2%80%99s-next-security-threat (noting concern among local
communities and the Nigerian government that the Civilian Joint Task Force
(CJTF), a group of vigilantes who have been instrumental in protecting their
communities from Boko Haram, have used their allegiance to and power from the
national security forces in order to commit human rights violations such as
extrajudicial killings, sexual abuse, and exploitation).
55. See id. (explaining that because of the Civilian Joint Task Force’s
association to the Nigerian military’s Joint Task Force, the group of vigilantes has
often acted as if it is above the law when protecting local communities from Boko
Haram).
56. Id.
57. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3,
opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S 135 (entered into
force Oct. 21, 1950).
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upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;
d) the passing of sentences and carrying out of execution without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples.58

The above obligations and prohibitions were impliedly provided in
the proviso contained Martens Clause59 on which Common Article 3
is built upon. However, due to the brevity of Common Article 3,60 a
legal regime of 263 words, Additional Protocol II to the Geneva
Convention was adopted to improve upon the “minimum” protection
afforded by both the Martens Clause and Common Article 3.
Nigeria, being a party to both the Geneva Convention and the two
Additional Protocols,61 has adopted the basic foundation of laws of
war with its attendant regulation of internal conflict. In fact, Nigeria
domesticated the Geneva Convention through the promulgation of
the Geneva Convention Act in 1960 that was re-enacted in 2004.62
Nevertheless, the provisions of Additional Protocols to the Geneva
Convention, especially Additional Protocol II, which governs a
specific type of non-international conflict, were not included in this
domestication.63 Rather, the Nigerian political administrations
objected to the domestication of the Additional Protocol II, perhaps,
58. Id.
59. Rupert Ticehurst, The Martens Clause and the Laws of Armed Conflict, 317
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 125, 125 (1997) (providing that the Martens Clause was
introduced into the preamble to the 1899 Hague Convention II-Law and Customs
of War on Land and that the Clause took its name from a declaration read by
Friedrich Martens, the Russians delegate at The Hague Peace Conference of 1899).
60. See THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 COMMENTARY: IV
GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN
TIME OF WAR 34 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958) (providing commentary on Common
Article 3); David A. Elder, The Historical Background of Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Convention of 1949, 11 CASE WESTERN RES. J. INT’L L. 37, 54 (1979)
(explaining that Article 3 is characterized as a convention in miniature).
61. Treaties, State Parties and Commentaries Nigeria, INT’L COMM. RED
CROSS, https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreatiesByCountrySelect
ed.xsp?xp_countrySelected=NG (last visited Jan. 17, 2018) (listing all four
Conventions that Nigeria became party to by accession on June 9, 1961, and by
ratifying the Additional Protocols in 1988).
62. Geneva Conventions Act (1990) Cap. (162) (Nigeria).
63. Jide James-Eluyode, Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law in
Nigeria, 3 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 264, 264-74 (2003).
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on the ground that the provisions might actually favor guerilla
fighters and terrorists, affording them a status that the Nigeria
believes they do not deserve.64
Notwithstanding its non-domestication, some of the provisions of
the Additional Protocols are protected under the Nigerian
Constitution.65 The Constitution, like the Additional Protocols,
guarantees persons charged with an offence the right to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty according to law,66 and to be fairly and
publicly tried.67 In addition, Nigeria’s municipal penal laws are not
criminally silent on inhumane conducts during conflict.68 The
Nigerian Criminal Code, for example, outlaws some inhumane
conducts similar to those outlawed by the Convention and Additional
Protocols.69 Furthermore, the Nigerian Army Act70 contains offences
relating to the conduct of warfare and peace time activities of the
army.
On the plane of customary international law, the requirement that
action taken in self-defense must not exceed what is necessary and
proportionate continues to apply notwithstanding Nigeria’s objection
to the domestication of Additional Protocol II.71 As the ICJ
explained in the Nicaragua case, there is a “specific rule whereby
self-defence would warrant only measures which are proportional to
the armed attack and necessary to respond to it.”72 While the
64. See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, I CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 47, 49 (2005) (stating that Nigeria has
stated that “military advantage” refers to the advantage anticipated from the
military attack considered on the whole and not only from isolated or particular
parts of that attack); Applying International Humanitarian Law Rules to the ‘War’
Between Nigeria and the Boko Haram Sect By Nonso Robert Attoh, EDUC. RES.
PROVIDERS, https://www.educationalresourceproviders.com/applying-international
-humanitarian-law-rules-to-the-war-between-nigeria-and-the-boko-haram-sect/
(last visited Jan. 17, 2018) (stating that Nigeria has not domesticated Additional
Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions).
65. CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), §23.
66. Id. § 36(5).
67. Id. § 36(2), (4).
68. Id. § 15.
69. Criminal Code Act (1990) Cap. (77), §§ 306, 315, 351-53, 355, 360, 364,
369, 443, 452.
70. Armed Forces Act (2004), Cap. (A20), §§ 36-38, 66, 68, 71 (Nigeria).
71. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 64, at 47.
72. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J ¶
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requirement of proportionality limits a state’s ability to resort to
force, necessity declares that a state may not resort to armed force
unless it has no other means to defend itself.
Strict adherence to the above rules of war has become imperative
in Nigeria’s Boko Haram conflict because there can be strong
prudential considerations that militate in its favor. These include
securing public and international support, ensuring that Boko Haram
is not given the propaganda gift of atrocities, and maintaining
discipline and high professional standards in anti-Boko Haram
squads. In contrast, the following Section will take a look at how
these laws of war are flagrantly violated in anti-Boko Haram
operations. Most especially, it will show that the counterbalance
targeted strikes of Nigerian security forces constitute war crimes and
crime against humanity.

IV. VIOLATION(S) IN THE OPERATIONS:
THE BREACH OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW
After identifying the laws of war, particularly IHL applicable to
anti-Boko Haram operation, serious concern remains with the
impunity with which these laws are violated. To be sure, the laws of
war are designed to limit the effects of armed conflict on people who
are not or are no longer participating in hostilities and to restrict the
means and methods of warfare. But a sampling of today’s conflicts
shows that the laws of war are being completely ignored.73
Despite Nigeria’s obligation under the humanitarian laws of war;
it would be difficult to conclude that the Boko Haram offensive
attacks and, worst still, the counter-balance targeted strikes of
Nigerian security forces are consistent with core rule of law norms.74
As stated in the Introduction, a Preliminary Examination Report on
Nigeria released by the International Criminal Court’s Office of
176.
73. Egbejule, supra note 54; AMNESTY INT’L, STARS ON THEIR SHOULDERS.
BLOOD ON THEIR HANDS. (2015).
74. John Thomas Didymus, HRW: Satellite Images Reveal ‘Nigerian Army
Abuse’ in Baga, DIGITAL J. (May 3, 2013), http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/
349366; Borno & Yobe States Peoples Forum, supra note 5.
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Prosecutor identified two possible cases of war crimes and crime
against humanity perpetrated by the Nigerian Military.75
In particular, in the April 2013 Baga clashes,76 officials of the task
force were allegedly accused of summary execution, torture,
arbitrary detention amounting to internment and outrages against the
dignity of civilians, as well as rape.
Reported by Amnesty
International, the armed forces also starved, suffocated and tortured
more than 7,000 to death in military detention camps since March
2011, and a further 1,200 were rounded up and unlawfully killed.77
The general indignation caused by terrorist attacks can affect the
implementation of jus in bello when fighting terrorism is the basis
for resorting to war under the jus ad bellum.78 In other words,
because the Boko Haram Sect started the war, it is sometimes
argued, they are responsible for all the death and destruction that
ensue. More so, there is a little doubt that concern about the whole
principle of thinking about terrorism in a laws of war framework
might lead to the violation of the rules of law79 by the Nigerian
military. To refer to such a framework, which recognizes rights and
duties, might seem to imply a degree of moral acceptance of the right
of any particular group to resort to acts of violence, at least against
military target.80 Conversely, by the legal maxim ex-injuria non
orictur jus,81 it seems unacceptable that an aggressor should benefit
from the protections afforded by the laws of war.
Despite its plausibility, implying that certain reasoning might
override the rules of war has no basis in law. To reiterate, in anti–
terrorist war as in other wars, there can be strong prudential

75. ICC, REPORT ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION ACTIVITIES ¶¶ 210-15
(2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-PE-rep-2015-Eng.pdf.
76. Didymus, supra note 74.
77. New Amnesty Report: Senior Members of Nigerian Military Must be
Investigated for War Crimes, AMNESTY INT’L (June 2, 2015), https://www.amnesty
usa.org/press-releases/new-amnesty-report-senior-members-of-nigerian-militarymust-be-investigated-for-war-crimes/ [hereinafter New Amnesty Report].
78. See supra Part II.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See Moussa, supra note 20, at 966 (interpreting ex injuria non oritur jus to
mean one should not be able to profit from one’s own wrongdoing).
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considerations in favor of observing the laws of war.82 Nevertheless,
the conflict between Nigeria and Boko Haram has rendered the
straight forward observance of IHL difficult. Indeed, such a conflict
involves a blurring of the distinctions between war, organized crime
and large scale violation of human rights; and differs from traditional
warfare in its goal, method and economy.83
As a result, IHL is becoming incapable of acting alone for the sake
of human security. To recall, Common Articles 3, which is the core
of rules applicable to internal armed conflict, is a legal regime in
miniature; and does not regulate the conduct of hostilities at all.
Meanwhile, Additional Protocol II only does so with respect to
civilians, and then only in general terms. Neither instrument, for
example, provides any guidance on the legality of attacks taking part
in hostilities. It then follows that recourse could be made to IHRL, at
least to regulate the conduct of hostilities in internal conflicts. As
will be discussed in Part IV, IHL and IHRL, while distinct, may both
be applicable to a particular situation. The relationship between IHL
and IHRL has been one of concurrency.

V. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AS
THE COMPLEMENTING RULES FOR NONINTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT
A. THE ICJ APPROACH
The classic recognition of the application of IHRL as applied in
situations of armed conflict is the ICJ’s observation in its 1996

82. See supra Part II (listing prudential considerations including securing
public and international support and maintaining discipline and high professional
standards).
83. Andrea Kazan, The effect of new wars on the relationship between
international humanitarian law and international human rights law, HUM.
SECURITY CTR. (July 1, 2015), http://www.hscentre.org/security-and-defence/
effect-new-wars-relationship-international-humanitarian-law-international-humanrights-law/ (explaining that a new type of organized violence has emerged in which
the goal of warfare shifted from geopolitical and ideological goal to identity
politics: the method of warfare shifted from territory to a drive to “mobilize
extremist policies based on fear and hatred;” and the economy of new wars is
decentralized, as opposed to the centralized war economies of traditional conflict).
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Nuclear Weapons84 Advisory Opinion.85 There, the court noted that
the protection of the International Covenant for Civil and Political
Rights (“ICCPR”). does not cease in times of war.86 This recognition
was not only reiterated, but consequently expanded upon by the ICJ
in 2004 when it was called upon to address the lawfulness of the
construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.87 The
Court affirmed that IHRLcontinued to apply in case of armed
conflict, and can thus help to strengthen the resiliency of vulnerable
population.
The emphasis of the ICJ showed the jurisprudential acceptance of
the logic and necessity of applying IHRL in armed conflict. As the
court has clearly observed in its 2004 opinion, there are situations in
which some rights may be exclusively matters of IHL; some,
exclusively matters of Human Rights Law; and others, matters of
both regimes.88 By this observation, the Court presented the
understanding that the explicit terms of both IHRL and IHL
instruments are in accord, and especially obvious (as one may add) in
non-international armed conflict.89
Nevertheless, the ICJ failed to suggest any general coordinating
criterion for the third situation (i.e. those in which the rights in
question were ‘matters of both . . . branches of International Law’).90
The Court only went on to caution that, in order to answer the
question facing it (i.e. whether the actions of Israel were inconsistent
with its international obligations, and if so, what were the
consequences), it has to “take into consideration both these branches
of International Law, namely human rights laws and, as lex specialis,
international humanitarian law.”91 The Court’s reference to the
application of humanitarian law as lex specialis to human rights law
84. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 240.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 131, ¶ 106 (July 9).
88. Id. (explaining that the Court will have to consider “these branches of
international law”—international humanitarian law and human rights law—when
answering questions concerning the relationship between the branches).
89. Id. ¶¶ 106-11.
90. Id. ¶ 106.
91. Id.
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has been the origin of tension between these bodies of International
Law.92
Conceding that the rules provided by humanitarian law are
typically fairly specific as they are designed to be interpreted and
applied by military commanders, such rules are far less extensive in
situation of internal armed conflict. Therefore, the presumption that
IHL is more specific; and so can be applied by way of lex specialis
principle is, while attractive, not always entirely accurate. Thus, the
move for customary international law to fill the blank canvas appears
decisive.
This move is the archetype of jurisprudence of
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)93
and the customary international humanitarian study conducted by the
International Committee of the Red Cross.94
Although both contributions are ground-breaking and gap-filling,
it remains doubtful whether their opinio juris are drawn from state
practice.95 Do the methodology and the underlying evidence on
which they rely relate with state practice? For instance, if Nigeria is
obstinate to acknowledge the applicability of treaty based
humanitarian law, it will be out of place to draw a conclusion as to
opinio juris from her practice just because she is a party to both the
Geneva convention and its Protocols. Even if one were to accept
filling the gaps with customary international law, the task of
92. See id.
93. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Had+ihasanović, Case No. )T-01-47-AR73.3,
Decision on Joint Defence Interlocutory Appeal of Trial Chamber Decision on
Rule 98BIS Motion for Acquittal, ¶ 26-30 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Mar. 11, 2005%# Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. )T-94-1-I, Decision on
Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 100-18 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
94. Int’l Committee Red Cross, Meeting of the Intergovernmental Group of
Experts for the Protection of War Victims, Geneva, 23-27 January 1995:
Recommendations, (Sept. 1, 1995), https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/
article/other/57jmbm.htm.
95. John B. Bellinger, III & William J Haynes II, A US Government Response
to the International Committee of the Red Cross Study Customary International
Humanitarian Law, 89 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 443, 443-44 (2007) (explaining that
the United States is not in a position to accept the ICRC’s conclusions that
particular rules related to the laws and customs of war in fact reflect customary
international law without the authors providing sufficient facts and evidence in
support of those rules).
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precisely ascertaining the rules that have customary status, as well as
the possibility of a situation where there is no analogous rule in IHL,
may override the essence of such an acceptance.96
On the other hand, the practice of using IHRL to complement IHL
is a critical point: the nationality and area of operations of the nonstate actors are critical for both the jurisprudential and normative
bases for applying human rights obligations.97 Although born in
Nigeria, Boko Haram has spread across the world. The sect
perpetrates its heinous crimes against the people of Cameroon98,
Niger99, and Chad.100 Even, its connection to ISIL is never in
doubt.101 Furthermore, IHRL was not designed specifically to
regulate armed conflict situations and does not concern specific rules
governing the use of force and the means and methods of warfare in
that context.102 Together, this suggests that these bodies of
International Law can be mutually reinforcing; and as such, a
coordinating criterion, other than lex specialis, for the relationship
between IHL and IHRL in situation of internal armed conflict like
96. Sandesh Sivakumaran, Re-envisaging the International Law of Armed
Conflict, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 219, 244 (2011) (emphasizing that identification of
customary rules proves elusive).
97. Id. at 252 (pointing out that even if there are theoretically–satisfying reason
to explain how non-state armed groups are bound by international human rights
law, State may not accept this position for fear of likening non-state armed group
to States).
98. See Boko Haram suicide bombers attack Cameroon, PREMIUM TIMES (Nov.
24, 2016), www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/216257-boko-haram-suicide
-bombers-attack-cameroon.html.
99. See 5 soldiers, 30 Boko Haram Militants Killed in Niger Fighting,
PRESSTV (Sept. 14, 2016), http://www.presstv.com/Detail/2016/09/14/484677/
Niger-Boko-Haram-Toumour-Nigeria (recognizing Niger as one of the countries
that years of Boko Haram militancy has affected).
100. See Meria Svirsky, Boko Haram Infiltrates Chad in Precedent- Setting
Attack, CLARION PROJECT, Feb. 15, 2015, www.clarionproject.org/news/bokoharam-infiltrates-chad-precedent-setting-attack (stating that Boko Haram group
infiltrated the Chadian fishing village of Ngouboua on canoes in a predawn raid
that killed the local leader among others).
101. See ISIL Accepts Boko Haram’s Pledge of Allegiance, ALJAZEERA, Mar.
16, 2015, www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/03/isil-accepts-boko-haram-pledge-alleg
iance-150312201038730.html (indicating that the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant
has accepted a pledge of allegiance made by Nigeria’s Boko Haram).
102. Pertile & Vitucci, supra note 18 (affirming that it is only IHL that is
specifically designed to regulate armed conflict).
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that of Nigeria-Boko Haram conflict is a necessity.

B. COORDINATION OF IHL AND IHRL: A CASE FOR
SYSTEMIC INTEGRATION
Since the rules of IHL and IHRL are complementary and mutually
reinforcing, care needs to be taken when applying human rights
norms to complement IHL.103 As the ICTY recognized, norms
developed in the field of human rights can be transposed into IHL,
only if they take into consideration the specifics (regulatory design)
of the latter body of law.104 For instance, what constitutes an
“unlawful killing” in situations of armed conflict must be assessed on
the basis of the relevant rules of IHL, including the fact that
combatants or other persons taking a direct part in hostilities may be
attacked- even with lethal force; and that killing of civilians in
certain circumstances may not be prohibited- one suggested criterion
for such a co-ordination is the principle of ‘Systemic Integration’.105
The principle, codified in Article 31(3)(C) of the VCLT, requires that
in interpreting a treaty provision, the interpreter should take into
account “any relevant rules of International Law applicable in
relations between the parties.”106
One should applaud the stand taken by the ICJ in the leading Case
of the Nuclear Weapon.107 Contrary to the belief of many, it has been
argued that the reference to the lex specialis nature of humanitarian
law has nothing to do with IHL prevailing over or displacing IHRL,
but rather would appear to be used as a shorthand for the proposition
that, where human rights obligations fall to be applied in situation of
103. Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Humanitarian Law, Human Rights and Refugee
Law-Three Pillars, (Apr. 21-23, 2005) (explaining that in certain matters for which
IHL lays down a “self-contained” set of rules, the provisions of IHL apply to the
exclusion of human rights).
104. Id. (emphasizing that IHRL must be applied in armed conflict through the
prism of IHL).
105. See id. (cautioning that the lawfulness of deaths resulting as a consequence
of permissible “collateral damage” must be assessed pursuant to IHL’s principle of
proportionality which requires a balancing of the incidental loss of civilian life or
injury to civilians with the concrete and direct military advantage expected from a
particular attack).
106. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 22, at 340.
107. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 240.
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armed conflict, due effect should be given to the requirement to
interpret the relevant obligations in light of, and consistently with,
the equally applicable rules of IHL.108 Indeed, the Court interpreted
human rights provision taking into account IHL rules, which is an
application of the principle of Systemic Integration.109
International bodies, and even courts, have frequently invoked the
principle as a coordinating criterion for the relationship between IHL
and IHRL.110 They have done so expressly and by implication, or on
the basis of equivalent provisions included in some constitutive
instruments. In General Comment (GC) no.3 on the right to life, the
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, confirmed that
Systemic Integration is the appropriate coordinating criterion for the
relationship between these two bodies of law in that it gives room for
the rule of one to be interpreted in light of the other.111
However, it is possible to interpret rules of humanitarian laws in
light of the one of human rights law which may not even emanate
from the freewill of sovereign states and vice versa. In this regard,
the remainder of this Article will conclude that certain rules are
peremptory in nature; and thereby free from the attack of the
108. Borelli, supra note 21, at 7 (noting that the use of the words “lex specialis”
in Nuclear Weapons occurred in the specific context of the court’s discussion of
the narrow question of the operation is situations of armed conflict of the right to
life under Article 6 of the ICCPR, which prohibits the “arbitrary” deprivation of
life).
109. Id. at 9 (arguing that far from being an application of the lex specialis
principle, an approach that the ICJ resorted to is far closer to the principle of
systemic integration).
110. See Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croat. v. Serb.),
Judgment, 2008 I.C.J. 412 (Nov. 18); Coard v. United States, Case 10.951, InterAm. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 109/99, OEA/Serv.L/V/II.106, doc. 3 rev. ¶ 37
(1999). Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo
v. Uganda), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, 2000 I.C.J. 111
(Jul. 1).
111. Vito Todeschini, The Relationship between International Humanitarian
Law and Human Rights Law in the African Commission’s General Comment on
the Right to Life, EIJL: TALK (June 7, 2016), https://www.ejiltalk.org/therelationship-between-international-humanitarian-law-and-human-rights-law-in-theafrican-commissions-general-comment-on-the-right-to-life/ (stating that the
African Commission refrained from invoking lex specialis to read the interplay
between humanitarian law and human rights law, but rather the principle of
systemic integration).

660
principle

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.
of

state

sovereignty

and

its

[33:3
consensual

theory.

VI. IS SOVEREIGN CONSENSUAL THEORY IN
TENSION WITH SYSTEMIC INTEGRATION? REAFFIRMING THE PEREMPTORY NATURE OF
HUMAN RIGHTS
The resort to coordinate the norms of IHL and IHRL through
the principle of systemic integration leaves open the question of why
a sovereign state would agree to a mandatory rule of treaty
interpretation which could have as a consequence that the
interpretation of a treaty to which that state is a party is affected by
other rules of International Law which that state has decided not to
accept.112 Accordingly, why must Nigeria, as a sovereign nation, be
bound by rules of treaty–based humanitarian law which do not
emanate from her freewill? After all, treaties are principally
dependent on the consent of the contracting parties, and they cannot
give rights and impose obligations on third states.113
To recapitulate, Article 31 (3)(C) stipulates that, in interpreting a
treaty, there shall be taken into account “any relevant rules of
International Law applicable in the relations between the parties”.114
While it is concluded that the “relevant rules” referred to in this
provision can be norms having their pedigree in any of the human
rights charters, it is still unsettled whether the term ‘parties’ refers to
all parties to, for instance, the treaty establishing the “relevant rules,”
or whether it is sufficient that the parties to a particular dispute are
bound by the rule in question.115 The whole idea behind the approach
112. Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval
and Marketing of Biotech Products, ¶¶ 7-68, WT/ DS291/R; WT/DS292/R; WT/
DS293/R, (Sept. 29, 2006) [hereinafter WTO panel report].
113. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 22, at 332
(noting that free consent is one of the universally recognized principles of
international law).
114. Id.
115. See Bruno Simma, Universality of International Law from the Perspective
of a Practitioner, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 265 (2009) (quoting the ILC’s Study on
Fragmentation that a construction of the term ‘parties’ makes it practically
impossible ever to finds multilateral context where reference to other multilateral
treaties as aids to interpretation under Article 31 (3) (c) will be allowed due to the
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of WTO panel in the EC-Approval and Marketing of Biotech
Products case116 is that every society or state should be the master of
its own fate. The will of state is said to be expressed in domestic law
through legislation and in the case of international law through
consent to international rules. Thus, no treaty binds a state that has
not consented to it.
Generally, though sovereign consensual theory117 is in tension with
the application of Systemic Integration, it is not as much as it
imagined being the basis of international law. An understanding of
jus cogens norms118, together with courts’ practices, exposes the
limitation of sovereign consensual theory. As stated in the
Introduction, some rules are of such great necessity to human kind
that the requirement of consent to establish binding obligations on
states would be undesirable, such as the norms of jus cogens.119
First embodied in Article 53 of the 1969 VCLT, jus cogens (or ius
cogens) is a Latin phrase for peremptory norm; and in private law, it
means those contractual terms that are forbidden because they violate
a public norm.120 The older notion of jus cogens, which is expressed
in the VCLT, limits the scope of international legal obligation (a
treaty or a customary obligation) that would violate certain
overarching principles.121 The newer version of jus cogens imposes
an obligation in and of itself. In other words, jus cogens shields a
state from assuming certain international legal obligation, as much as
it directly imposes certain international legal obligations, even if a
unlikelihood of the precise congruence in the membership of most important
multilateral convention).
116. Id. at n. 87.
117. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 238
(noting that states have used the principles of sovereignty and consent to argue that
they are only bound by treaties to which they are parties and customary
international law).
118. See Gennady Danilenko, International Jus Cogens: Issues of Law-Making,
2 EUR. J. INT’L L. 42, 42 (1991) (identifying jus cogens as a “higher law” with
overriding importance in international law).
119. See supra Part I.
120. See William E. Conklin, The Peremptory Norms of the International
Community, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 837, 837 (2012) (noting that jus cogens or
peremptory norms are universal principles from which no state may derogate).
121. See id. (arguing that jus cogens are norms which are superior to other rules
of international law and can only be overridden by subsequent peremptory norms).
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state has not accepted it. Thus, the bootstrap aspect of it is that jus
cogens gives room for both international and municipal tribunals in
getting around limits on their jurisdictions.
Indeed, violations of jus cogens norm create an automatic right to
a remedy for victims. Even when a victim cannot pursue a claim
procedurally,122 the offending state retains an obligation to provide a
remedy.123 The obligations to remedy is a fundamental aspect of a
state’s obligation to abide by the jus cogens norm. It would be
unusual for sovereign consensual theory to require a state to violate a
jus cogens norm: if that were to occur the VCLT makes it clear that
such a theory would be void.124. The Vienna Convention says
nothing more than that a theory or treaty in conflict with a jus cogens
norm is void and an ambivalence can be observed elsewhere
regarding further effects of jus cogens beyond invalidating
incompatible norm.125
However, there is almost intrinsic relationship between
peremptory norms and human rights. Most of the case law in which
the concept of jus cogens has been invoked is taken up with human
rights.126 Even before the adoption of the VCLT, human rights were
perceived as inherent to jus cogens as opposed to jus dispositivism.
Among the examples provided by the International Law Commission
of norms which could be characterized as peremptory in character,
those concerned with human rights stood out.127
122. See Lorna McGregor, State immunity and Jus Cogens, 55 INT’L & COMP.
L.Q. 437, 439 (2006).
123. But see Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), Judgment, 2012
I.C.J. Rep. 96, ¶¶ 251-53 (Feb. 3) (noting that jus cogens cannot be used as a
justification to override other international obligations like state immunity).
124. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 22, at 344, 347
(stating that treaties which violate peremptory norms are void).
125. See LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT, CRITERIA, PRESENT STATUS,
293-315 (1988) (pointing out that the sole invalidating power of jus cogens lies in
the area of the law of treaties, while the mode of response to possible violation of
peremptory norms seems exclusively to be collective action taken by the
International Community as whole through UN bodies).
126. See Andrea Bianchi, Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens, 19 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 491, 491 (2008) (arguing there is an “almost intrinsic relationship”
between jus cogens and human rights).
127. Id. See generally Documents of the Second Part of the Seventeenth Session
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What is even more interesting is that recently the Court of First
Instance of the European Communities indirectly reviewed the
legality of S.C anti-terror resolutions against the background of
human rights peremptory norms.128
So what would a peremptory nature of human rights look like? It
would involve considering the following: (1) opinio juris, the
recognition that these crimes are assumed part of general customary
law; (2) language in preambles or other provisions of treaties
applicable to these crimes which indicates these crimes’ higher status
in international law; (3) the large number of states which have
ratified treaties related to these crimes; and (4) the ad hoc
international investigations and prosecutions of perpetrators of these
crimes.129 Another approach to determining the cogens status of
general international law is the one that the International Law
Commission held “it is not the form of a general rule of international
law but the particular nature of the subject matter with which it deals
that may, in the opinion of the Commission, give it the character of
jus cogens.”130
The above approaches grant prohibition of torture and arbitrary
killing in anti-terrorism operation a jus cogens status when we take
into consideration factors that determine the nature of this subject
matter that derive from the importance and attention that the
international community dedicates to it. As the International
Criminal Court’s (ICC) Office of the Prosecutor found in its
report,131 at least most of the institutional culpability in anti-Boko
and of the Eighteenth Session Including the Reports of the Commission to the
General Assembly, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 248 U.N. Doc
A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add. 1 (providing examples of human rights abuses as those
which violate jus cogens).
128. See Case T-306/01, Yusuf v. Council of Eur. Union, 2005 E.C.R. II-3533
(concerning freezing funds and prohibiting trade that might aid the Taliban in
Afghanistan); see also Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council of Eur. Union, 2005 E.C.R.
II-3649 (concerning restrictions placed on persons and entities associated with
Osama bin-Laden).
129. Artan Sadaki, Identifying the Prohibition of Torture as Jus Cogens of
International Law (Oct. 20, 2008) (unpublished essay) (examples.essaytoday.biz/
essays/Prohibtion-of-Torture-As-Jus-Cogens-1151090.html) (highlighting ways
through which jus cogen status of prohibition of torture can be determined).
130. Id.
131. See REPORT ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION ACTIVITIES, supra note 12, ¶¶
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Haram operation met the standard for crimes against humanity, the
prohibitions of which may be a jus cogens norm.
Take for example, the slaughtering of 640 men and boys in Giwa
killing,132 and tortures in Baga clashes133 by the armed forces in
Nigeria are considered as violation of jus cogens norm which
shocked the conscience of mankind. Even, if Nigeria fails to
domesticate Additional Protocol II134 and other IHLs, she is still
bound by jus cogen norms of prohibition of torture and arbitrary
killing which gave rise to the obligation er ga omnes135 to take action
against those who torture or carry out acts of arbitrary killing.

VII. CONCLUSION
So much for ‘Systemic Integration’ as a coordinating criterion for
norms of IHL and IHRL; however, the recognition of the criterion as
applicable to the prohibition of torture and arbitrary killing did not
have much impact on the Nigeria’s Boko Haram conflict. Even
though the Rome statute136 envisions that the security agents
responsible for humanitarian crime and crime against humanity
should be tried in domestic courts when possible or, where the state
is unwilling, by or in collaboration with the ICC;137 remedial justice
for the people, whose rights have been brutally violated, as a
211-15 (noting multiple cases of human rights abuses on the part of the Nigerian
counterinsurgency forces, including arbitrary arrests, torture, killing of civilians,
and the recruitment of child soldiers).
132. See Borno & Yobe States Peoples Forum, supra note 5 (noting that
Nigeria’s counterinsurgency task force was accused of killing 600 unarmed
civilians during its attack on the Giwa Military Barracks in Maiduguri).
133. See id. (highlighting the burning of villages and attacks and torture of
civilians attributed to Nigeria’s security forces in their campaign against Boko
Haram).
134. See James-Eluyode, supra note 63, at 270 (noting that Nigerian law does
not give domestic effect to Additional Protocol II).
135. See Ardit Memeti, The Concept of Erga Omnes Obligations in
International Law, NEW BALKAN POL. (2013), http://www.newbalkanpoli
tics.org.mk/item/the-concept-of-erga-omnes-obligations-in-international-law#.
WlLlXiOZOqA (explaining that the concept of erga omnes obligations refers to
specifically determined obligations that states have towards international
community as a whole).
136. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 106, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90.
137. Id.
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consequence of the institutional culpability of Nigeria’s armed forces
in the anti-Boko Haram operation, is scarcely done.138 In some rare
instances, however, the Nigerian government has taken some
promising steps to bring perpetrators of abuse to justice.139 Yet, up
till now, there had been no conviction.
This could be as a result of the Nigerian courts’ own reticence to
adopt a more activist stance; thereby denying justice to the victims
and further solidifying the culture of impunity for ‘collateral
damages,’ which could be a human life. This reticence might have
arisen from a concern to reassure the government of the courts’
fidelity to clearly established legal norms, and a healthy skepticism
to apply norms de lege ferenda too readily. Perhaps too, many
judges might simply have been out-of-touch with the growing
concurrent application of the norms of human rights and
humanitarian law in situations of internal armed conflict.
Now, how can the principle of systemic integration coordinate the
two bodies of international law unto remedial justice? This task
places responsibilities on different actors: first, the sovereign state of
Nigeria as one of the principal creators of international legal rules
ought to be aware of the need for integration of IHL and IHRL in
particular. Secondly, international organizations and courts, when
they interpret and apply these two bodies of law, need to bear in
mind that they are acting within an overarching framework of
international law.
Finally, Nigerian courts, which play as ever more relevant role in
the application of international law, must also be aware of the impact
that their activities can have on the development of international
legal system; and thus systematize it unto a remedial justice.
138. See World Report 2016: Nigeria, HUM. RTS. WATCH (2016),
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/nigeria
(noting
that
despite allegation of widespread security force abuses, the Nigerian authorities
have rarely held anyone accountable, and that government of officials often issue
blanket denials of alleged human rights violations).
139. See Nigeria: Prosecute Killings by Security Forces, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(November 26, 2009), https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/
nigeria (noting that in 2009 the Nigerian Minister of Justice, Micheal Aondoakaa
told the UN High Commisioner for Human Rights that Nigeria’s Government
“does not condone extra judicial killing or torture and condemns in its
entirety. . . .”).
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Achieving this feat is not easy, but Nigeria can leverage its judicial
strength and capability to bring about the desired justice.

